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I. JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to Section 78-
2a-3(2)(h), Utah Code Ann. (2006). 
II. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Whether the trial court had jurisdiction under the Cohabitant Abuse Act to grant a 
protective order when the parties never cohabited and their marriage had been earlier 
annulled and declared void ab initio, 
2. Whether the trial court erred by failing to hold a protective order hearing as 
required by Section 30-6-4.3 prior to issuing its Order Overruling Objection to 
Commissioner's Recommendation. 
1. Standard of Review 
The above stated issues involve questions of law, which the court reviews for 
correctness without deference to the trial court's determination. Brinkerhoffv. 
Brinkerhoff, 945 P.2d 113 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
See pages 5 and 6 herein. 
IV. STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
See pages 1 thru 6 herein. 
V. RULES PROVISION 
There are no rule provisions at issue in this case. 
VI. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal is based on the grant of a Protective Order entered on May 24, 2006 
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upon the recommendation of Commissioner Michael S. Evens and granted that same day, 
which was timely objected to by appellant on June 2, 2006, which objection was 
subsequently overruled by the Honorable Anthony B. Quinn, pursuant to his Order 
Overruling Objection to Commissioner's Recommendation entered on October 30, 2006. 
RELEVANT FACTS 
See pages 4-6 of the Appellant's Brief. 
ARGUMENT 
L A PROTECTIVE ORDER WAS INAPPROPRIATE INASMUCH AS 
THE PARTIES WERE NOT COHABITANTS UNDER THE 
COHABITANT ABUSE ACT 
The trial court lacked jurisdiction to grant a protective order where the parties 
never resided together, and their marriage had been declared void ab initio. Under the 
Cohabitant Abuse Act ("Act"), there are several ways to be classified as a "cohabitant." 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-6-1(2) (2006). Hall argues, and the district court found, that 
Corwell was a "cohabitant" under the Act, because he "was a spouse of [Hall]." § 30-6-
l(2)(a); (Appellee's Br. 4-6). However, the marriage had been annulled and had been 
declared void ab initio on March 29, 2006 (Appellant's Br. 6), which was before the 
protective order was granted on April 25, 2006 (R. at 6). 
Section 30-1-17.1, Utah Code Ann (2002), provides for two categories of 
grounds for annulment. The first is "[wjhen the marriage is prohibited or void under 
Title 30, Chapter 1." § 30-1-17.1(1). The second allows annulment "upon grounds 
existing at common law." § 30-1-17.1(2). Common law allows annulment "for a fraud 
going to the essence of the marriage." Haacke v. Glenn, 814 P.2d 1157, 1158 (Utah App. 
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1991). In determining fraud, courts consider the facts of the particular situation and have 
adopted a subjective standard. Id.; Costello v. Porzelt, 116 N.J. Super. 380, 388-89 
(1971) (husband failed to tell wife about his heroin addiction); Handley v. Handley, 179 
Cal. App. 2d 742, 747 (1960) (wife secretly never intended to live with husband). 
Because Hall engaged in "acts of misrepresentation for the inducement to marry," and 
Corwell relied thereon to his detriment, the judge granted a decree of annulment, 
"declaring the marriage to be void ab initio." (R. at 33-34.) 
The phrase "void ab initio" means "null from the beginning." Black's Law 
Dictionary 1604 (8th ed. 2004). Void ab initio is to be distinguished from "voidable" 
which means "[v]alid until annulled. . . . This term describes a valid act that may be 
voided rather than an invalid act that may be ratified." Id. While some marriages are void 
ab initio, others are voidable. In Re Marriage ofKunz, 2006 UT App 151, f 33, 136 P.3d 
1278. "A marriage void ab initio is void for all purposes and has no standing in court." 
Id. at \ 32 (quoting United States v. Lutwak, 195 F.2d 748, 753-54 (7th Cir. 1952), aff d, 
344 U.S. 604 (1953). Because the marriage between Hall and Corwell was declared void 
ab initio, it is void for all purposes and did not have legal validity at any time. In the 
order overruling the objection to the recommendation of the commissioner, the Judge 
held that "[t]he fact that they once had the status of a married couple is sufficient to 
confer jurisdiction under the act." (R. at 148-49.) However, at the time the protective 
order was issued, Hall and Corwell never had the status of a married couple because the 
marriage was declared void ab initio. Corwell cannot be deemed a "cohabitant" for 
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purposes of issuing a protective order because he neither "is or was a spouse of the other 
party" and does not meet any of the other definitions of a cohabitant in § 30-6-1(2). 
Hall, citing the definitional portion of the Cohabitant Abuse Act, § 30-6-1, points 
to the absence of an exception for annulled parties as evidence that the legislature 
intended to include all parties whose marriage had been annulled. (Appellee's Br. 4-6.) 
However, the absence of that exception should rather be construed as incorporating the 
statutory grounds for annulment provision § 30-1-17.1, which section also incorporates 
the common law regarding annulment, § 30-1-17.1(2). 
Applying the common law regarding annulment is not a "narrow and legalistic 
interpretation of the Act's cohabitant definition." (Appellee's Br. 7.) The Appellee cites 
Keene v. Bonser, 2005 UT App 37, 107 P.3d 693, for the proposition that terms in the 
cohabitant abuse context should be interpreted broadly. (Appellee's Br. 7.) It is clear that 
Bonser's argument was narrow and legalistic. He argued that he could not be a 
cohabitant under Utah Code Ann. § 30-6-l(2)(f) (2006), which defines a cohabitant as 
someone who "resides or has resided in the same residence," because he could not be 
defined as a resident for other purposes, such as to obtain a fishing license or a drivers 
license. Keene, 2005 UT App 37, % 9. The analysis for determining residency for these 
other purposes, such as to obtain a fishing license, is far different from the residency 
analysis under the Act, because the state's rationales for making a residency 
determination are distinct. Conversely, the analysis used to determine whether a person 
"is or was a spouse of the other party," § 30-6-l(2)(a), should be straightforward and 
follow the common law regarding annulment as referenced in § 30-1-17.1(2). Following 
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the rationale of the common law regarding annulment in this case would be consistent 
with the scope of the Act, because the parties did not have the intimate or domestic 
relationship that the Act encompasses. 
Hall also argues that "public policy dictates that the Act should extend protection 
to spouses who are victims of domestic violence even where there has been an 
annulment." (Appellee's Br. 4-6.) It is clear that the Act would still apply to the parties 
whose marriage had been annulled in the vast majority of circumstances. It would apply 
where the party "is or was living as if a spouse of the other party," Utah Code Ann. § 30-
6-l(2)(b) (2006), "has one or more children in common with the other party," § 30-6-
l(2)(d), "is the biological parent of the other party's unborn child," § 30-6-l(2)(e), or 
"resides or has resided in the same residence as the other party, § 30-6-l(2)(f). The 
expansive scope of the statute already includes the relationships in which domestic 
violence is likely to arise. The interpretation of §30-6-l(2)(b) that Hall asks this Court to 
make conflicts with the common law regarding annulments and violates the rules of 
statutory construction. SeeJerz v. Salt Lake County, 822 P.2d 770, 773 (Utah 1991) 
(stating that statutes should be construed to be in harmony with each other and avoid 
serious conflicts). Therefore, the common law regarding annulments and § 30-1-17.1 
should not be abrogated to include parties whose marriage had been declared void ab 
initio and do not meet any of the other definitions of "cohabitant" under § 30-6-1. 
It is important that individuals should not be classified as "cohabitant[s]" under § 
30-6-1 unless they meet the definitional requirements of that section. The facts of this 
case show that extending the definition of "cohabitant" to parties whose marriage had 
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been declared void ab initio and do not meet any of the other requirements would lead to 
a result the legislature did not intend. Judge Quinn stated that the purpose of the statute is 
"to provide relief for persons who are the victims of violence in intimate relationships." 
(R. at 148.) However, the facts leading to the granting of the protective order are not 
intimate or domestic in nature. The instance cited by Hall on page 8 of the Appellee's 
brief, that Corwell threatened to "punch her in the face" if she did not stop calling, came 
after Corwell and his girlfriend had received over 100 harassing and threatening 
telephone calls from Hall and her friends (R. at 58, Transcript of Protective Order 
Hearing, May 24, 2006, Page 9:8), and came at a time when Corwell was recovering 
from surgery and on pain medication (Appellant's Br. 5, R. at 52-53). The relationship of 
these parties is outside the definitional scope of "cohabitant" under the Cohabitant Abuse 
Act, § 30-6-1, and therefore the court lacked jurisdiction to enter a protective order. 
II. CORWELL DID NOT WAIVE ANY RIGHT TO A HEARING 
WHEN HE FILED HIS NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION 
Corwell filed a timely objection (R. at 89), to the issuance of the protective order 
on June 2, 2006, accompanied by a supporting memorandum (R. at 91-96). Pursuant to § 
30-6-4.3(l)(e), Utah Code Ann. (2006), the judge is required to hold a hearing within 20 
days from the day the objection was filed. Judge Quinn never schedule a hearing and 
Appellant filed a Notice to Submit for Decision almost five months later (R. at 146). 
Hall argues that Corwell waived his right to a hearing by filing a Notice to Submit 
for Decision and stating that "his motion objecting to the issuance of the protective order 
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was 'at issue and ready for decision of the Court.'" (Appellee's Br. 11.) The Notice to 
Submit for Decision states the following: 
1. Type of motion: Respondent's Objection to Commissioner's Issuance of Ex 
parte Protective Order (Request for Oral Argument and De Novo Review). . . . 
and, 
1. Type of motion: Memorandum in Support of Respondent's Objection to 
Commissioner's Issuance of Ex parte Protective Order (Request for Oral Argument and 
De Novo Review). (R. at 146.) 
Pursuant to Utah R. Civ. Proc. R. 7(D), the Notice to Submit for Decision included 
a request for a hearing, and yet Hall argues that Corwell waived his right to a hearing. 
Filing a Notice to Submit for Decision does not waive the right to a hearing where the 
request for a hearing is stated clearly in the Notice. 
The Appellee further argues that Corwell waived his right to a hearing where his 
arguments are characterized as legal as opposed to factual or evidentiary. There is no 
such limitation on the right to a hearing under Utah Code Ann. § 30-6-4.3(l)(e) (2006). 
Corwell was deprived of his statutory right to a hearing under § 30-6-4.3(l)(e) and was 
deprived of procedural due process where the court failed to conduct a hearing in a timely 
fashion. U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1; Utah Const. Art. I, § 7. If it is determined that the 
court had jurisdiction to issue a protective order, the case should be remanded for a 
hearing consistent with § 30-6-4.3(1 )(e). 
CONCLUSION 
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Corwell does not meet the definition of a "cohabitant" under § 30-6-l(2)(a), Utah 
Code Ann. (2006), because the marriage was declared void ab initio and because the 
other definitional provisions of § 30-6-1 are inapplicable to him. Therefore, the court did 
not have jurisdiction to enter a protective order under § 30-6-2. If this Court determines 
that the district court did have jurisdiction to issue a protective order, the case should be 
remanded with directions to hold a hearing because Corwell was denied his right to a 
hearing under § 30-6-4.3(l)(e) and did not waive his right to a hearing by filing a Notice 
to Submit for Decision. ^ 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ' S> day of June, 2007. 
RANDY S. LUDLOW 
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